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BAR BRIEFS
(Continued from page one)
Aeronautics and the aid being extended in the drafting of the
new Aeronautical code covering the field of Aeronautical law.
There were also some very fine section meetings held, including the Junior Bar Conference and the section meeting on taxation which was well attended.
It is fairly well understood that the next meeting of the
American Bar Association will occur very likely in the City of
Detroit, Michigan. It is some years ago, in 1925 I believe, since
the American Bar Association held a meeting there.
In the program of entertainment afforded visiting lawyers
was a visit to the home of James Whitcomb Riley, the Hoosier
Bard, author of "The Old Swimmin' Hole" and other poems.
HARRISON A. BRONSON, President.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS WAIVER BY
CORPORATIONS
A corporation can speak only through its officers and agents,
and their declarations made in the course of their employment,
and relating to the immediate transaction in which they are engaged, are always competent against the corporation. So thus
it would be reasonable to say 'that if a corporation can waive the
statute of limitation it would have to do so through its officers.
Where the directors of a corporation representing its entire
stock and ownership, on recovering money by litigation, turned
it over to the president to pay bills, without specifying any particular bill, and he paid the claim which was barred by the statute
of limitations, it was held that the corporation cannot recover
the payment of this claim in an action of money had and received.
The president of a corporation may be expressly authorized, or
may have authority by virtue of his being entrusted generally
with the management of the business, to pay claims, and by such
authority he may pay claims that are barred by the statute of
limitations. And in an action for money had and received the
corporation will not be successful.
Whether a corporate officer or agent is acting within the apparent scope of his authority is a question of fact, and is a question to be decided by the jury on all the evidence in the particular
instance. However, the question of authority need not be submitted to the jury where the undisputed evidence shows that the
officer or agent had general and special authority to do the acts
in question. Whether an implied authority arises from certain
facts is a question of law which should not be submitted to the
jury, but to the court. Ordinarily, authority of corporation's
agents to waive the statute of limitations will not be proved. Thus
the authority of an officer or agent of a corporation to waive the
statute of limitations rests on the principal of implied or express
agency. A president of a corporation by mere virtue of his office has no authority to waive the statute of limitations, or to
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bind the corporation by his promise not to plead the statute. But
according to the more modern authorities, the president of a corporation has power to institute suits on its behalf, to accept service of citation, or other legal process, and to waive legal delays.
Such a trend would suggest that a president could waive the
statute of limitations without implied authority, or at least only
very little implication of such authority would be needed to bind
the corporation in the execution of such waiver.
Where the president of a bank had managed its affairs with
little assistance from directors for five years previous to the suspension of the bank, and upon the suspension of the bank without being authorized by the directors the president issued scrip
to the creditors payable in three years, and wound up the affairs
of the bank, collected assets and applied them to payment of scrip
until remaining assets were levied upon Under execution, and the
stockholders had not fully paid their subscriptions which were
payable upon calls by the directors which they never made, the
court held that, although upon the bank's suspension a cause of
action arose in favor of creditors against the bank's stockholders
for the unpaid subscription, the running of the statute of limitations was postponed for three years by the issuance of the scrip,
and that the bank was bound by the issuance of such scrip. Also
a waiver of the right to plead the statute of limitations to an
action to enforce the liability of a bank as a stockholder in a corporation in consideration of extension of time, is binding on the
bank when signed for its best interest by its president who was
its general manager, and allowed to act for it according to his
judgment, under a by-law giving him general supervision of the
business of the corporation and power to perform duties which
its interest might require, although the directors never knew of
its execution. Where D bank was indebted to P Company, and
P Company threatened to bring action on the debt, and upon seeing the president of the D bank, the president assured P Company that D bank would not plead the statute of limitations if
more time were given to raise the money to pay the debt and that
D bank would pay the debt as soon as it could raise the money,
and P Company allowed the D bank more time, and the debt was
not paid as promised, P Company brought action against the D
bank which then pleaded the statute of limitations, the court held
that the action and promise of the president of the D bank revived the debt and that the same was not barred by the statute
of limitations.
Corporation cannot be heard-to say that the president and
comptroller in charge of tax matters were unauthorized to execute a waiver. Where waivers of limitations are signed by corporation's taxpayer's secretary and treasurer and bearing the
corporate seal, it was held that such was valid and binding on the
corporation as against the contention that the secretary and
treasurer were without authority to execute the waiver. Where
waiver exending time for assessment was filed by secretary and
treasurer, who signed original income tax returns, it was' held
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binding on corporation and receiver. Insurance companies may
also waive by their agents or officers the period within which
action against the company may be brought, that is, the period
allowed in which to file their claim against the company, or tn
notify the company of the claim. It is also held that the manager of a commercial company charged with its administration has
power to acknowledge a debt in the ordinary course of business
and thus interrupt prescription. Thus it can be seen that the
right of an officer or agent of a corporation to waive the statute
of limitations is determined from the facts relating to and leading up to the transaction.
The directors of a corporation, as its board, have the power
to waive-the statute of limitations as against a debt that is justly
due and owing. And the board of directors may also bind the
company by admissions and declarations, but a single director
cannot do so except as a special agent of the company. Also
where a debt is contracted by the directors of the corporation, as
such, or a note or obligation is executed by them as such, a payment or new promise made by their successors in that office will
keep the debt on foot and save it from operation of the statute of
limitations. But where the corporation is insolvent and the directors own the notes which are barred by the statute, payment
on notes is deemed void by Bankruptcy Law.
Generally, the powers of the executive committee are in some
way stated in the by-laws; and ordinarily such committee is given
all the authority of the board of directors, at least in the intervals between the sitting of the board. Thus it would be proper
to presume that the executive committee could waive the statute
of limitations to a just debt and which is still owing.
From an early ruling of an English court that held that a corporation is entitled to take advantage of the statute of limitations
as well as a private person, a fair inference can be drawn that
certainly at one time a serious doubt existed whether a corporation could plead the statute of limitations.
As to creditors objecting to the waiver of the statute, it is
held, that no creditor can interfere to prevent his debtor from
waiving the statute of limitations in regard to other claims. Also,
a legatee whose share has been attached by a creditor may confess
judgment in favor of the estate on a bona fide debt due the
decedent's estate which is barred by limitations, and which more
than offsets the legatee's share. Then also a husband may pay an
honest debt to his wife, however, ancient and stale it may appear
to his creditors, and he is not compelled by law to resort to the
statute of limitations as a defense, nor can other creditors insist
upon it for him, nor is she estopped to receive payment on the
debt. His actions must not be fraudulent, for then it would be
void.
As to the question whether directors or agents become personally liable for waiving the statute, it has been held that direc-

BAR BRIEFS
tors are not responsible for paying a just debt notwithstanding
that the corporation was insolvent at the time; but if the payment was an unlawful preference, the remedy, if any is against
the creditor. Where the statute of limitations has commenced to
run against the liability of officers for a corporate debt, it seems
that the running of the statute is not suspended or affected by the
recovery of the judgment against the corporation upon the debt,
nor by the renewal of the indebtedness by the corporation. In a
court of equity, the court commented that at all events it is not
too much to say that a party who claims to have paid a debt by a
successful plea of the statute, and seeks an affirmative remedy
on the ground of such fortunate venture, is not regarded as a
special favorite of the court. The statute of limitations is a personal privilege accorded by law for reason of public expediency;
and the privilege can only be asserted by a plea; the statute of
limitations only bars the remedy and not the-debt, and a debt uncollectable by operation of law taking away the remedy in sufficient consideration for the execution for a new promise to pay.
Although there is a dearth of authority, the cases there are
reveal that a corporation can and may waive the statute of limitations by its officers or directors or agents. But as to the question of the liability of the directors and officers for so waiving the
statute of limitations, no authority was found that dealt with the
situation directly in point. However, there is no question that
the moral obligation to pay a debt which has been barred by the
statute of limitations still exists. And in light of justice, the
performance of moral obligations should be encouraged instead
of impeded by imposing the risk of liability. And to label this
communicable performance by a manager of a corporation as
mismanagement for which a liability can be imposed is analagous
to saying that what is right is wrong. Thus it is submitted that
no liability should be imposed upon director and officers for so
waiving the statute of limitations.
P. M. SAND,
Former Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
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